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Introduction 
The emergence of the interdisciplinary field of ‘cultural memory studies’ (cf. Erll, 
2012) or more simply ‘memory studies’ (see Brown, 2008) has signaled the 
sheer diversity of the range of disciplines who take ‘memory’ to be meaningful 
conceptual and empirical object for themselves. Many of the contributing 
disciplines are located within the humanities and the social sciences –the recent 
Ashgate Research Companion to Memory Studies is edited by a philosopher, A 
Companion to Cultural Memory Studies by literary scholars, and the voluminious 
Routledge International Handbook of Memory Studies is overseen by sociologists. 
Interestingly out of the 92 chapters across these books, only 9 are written by 
psychologists. Whilst psychology feels, from within the discipline, to be the 
‘natural home’ for the study of memory, in purely numerical terms there is an 
enormous amount of research and theorizing going on outside of psychology 
departments.  
How ought we to respond to this proliferation of memory-oriented work? One 
strategy is to clearly delineate the taxonomy of core concepts that define a 
psychological approach to memory, as Roediger & Wertsch (2008) do in their 
significant early statement in launch issue of the journal Memory Studies. The 
desire to formalize in this context just what ‘memory’ is for psychologists (and 
more importantly what it is not) along with detailing how it can be legitimately 
studied, is understandable. The forms of reasoning and types of evidence used to 
make claims about memory across the humanities can seem quite alien to 
psychologists. They typically involve weighty philosophical speculation coupled 
with either linguistic data (e.g. archival material, oral history testimony, media 
reports) or analysis of material artifacts and practices (e.g. museum objects, 
urban landscapes, monuments). For some psychologists this difference in the 
construction of arguments and standards of evidence may lead to the conclusion 
that what is being talked about is unrecognizable as being about ‘memory’ at all.  
There is, however, a significant risk in prematurely demarcating the 
psychological from the non-psychological when we approach the topic of 
collaborative remembering. The terms of engagement with other disciplines can 
become fixed in advance, making it difficult to recognize the potential gains in 
engaging with alternative conceptualizations of core concepts. For example, the 
failure to see the manner in which the work of the sociologist Maurice 
Halbwachs (1980; 1992) actually offers a rigorous account of how socially 
derived categories restructure episodic memories through group processes (see 
Middleton & Brown, 2005), rather than, as sometimes claimed, offering a 
mystical notion of ‘collective mind’, has arguably set the dialogue between 
psychology and sociology back by a great many decades.  Similarly, the 
emergence of approaches within the discipline that offer significant 
reformulations of the nature of the psychological can also be overlooked. In the 
context of collaborative memory, two of the most significant have been the rise 
of a distinctive Sociocultural approach to remembering (e.g. Brockmeier, 2015; 
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Wertsch, 2002) and the contribution of Discursive Psychology (e.g. Edwards & 
Potter, 1992; Middleton & Edwards, 1990). Both these approaches prioritise the 
status of discursive and interactional processes and reformulate notions of ‘mind’ 
in ways that situate the psychological in a broader cultural and historical 
landscape. 
An alternative strategy is to set aside epistemic or methodological differences to 
look instead at convergence on key issues. Such convergence might not initially 
be apparent, since it can be buried beneath fraught debate over technical 
language or types of data, which distracts from the recognition of shared 
problematics. If we provisionally suspend questioning of what exactly falls 
within the domain of the psychological, it may be possible to see something of a 
common agenda. In this chapter we will describe what this agenda might be and 
how it can apprehended through a discussion of work in Autobiographical 
Memory and in Discursive Psychology. We will organize our discussion around 
four themes – function, accessibility, accuracy and life story. In each case we will 
begin by pointing to a core concept within the psychology of memory, then 
describing how this concept is reformulated through an attention to discourse. 
The relationship between the two approaches will then be treated as creating a 
productive tension that opens out onto a common ground. This quasi-dialectical 
method of considering differences in perspective is not intended as a call for 
grand synthesis, but rather as a way of attempting to move towards a mutual 
recognition that as memory researchers we are all in search of the psychological 
rather than driven by absolute categorical clarity of where exactly it is to be 
found and what precisely it constitutes (see Brown & Stenner, 2009). Finally we 
conclude with some remarks on what such recognition might imply for what 
Martin Conway (2012) calls a ‘modern view’, or what we would term an 
‘expanded view’ of memory.  
Function 
A concern with the functions of memory, or the uses that remembering serves to 
individuals, can be traced as a kind of subterranean current that flows through 
the psychology of memory. High water marks would include part II of Bartlett’s 
(1932) Remembering and Neisser’s (1978) well-known admonishments to the 
experimental psychology community. Bartlett offered an account of the 
sociocultural basis and functions of memory that continues to inspire inspire and 
inform contemporary work (see Wagoner, 2016), whilst Neisser famously 
claimed that a lack of concern for what memory actually does in ‘everyday’ 
contexts seriously undermined experimental studies (see Brown & Reavey, 
2016). It is unsurprising that a concern with function should have recently 
surfaced again within the study of Autobiographical Memory, given the way in 
which this area has explicitly engaged with social and cultural issues (e.g. 
Berntsen & Rubin, 2012). Identifying the uses that individuals make of their 
autobiographical memories goes a long way towards contextualizing processes 
of remembering (or, as it was originally formulated, ‘everyday memory’ – see 
Gruenberg et al, 1978). 
Susan Bluck’s work points towards three general classes of functions – directive 
(i.e. making use of the past to inform current and future actions); self (i.e. 
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supporting a sense of continuity of self over time) and social (i.e. facilitating 
social interaction and building social bonds) (see Alea & Bluck, 2003; Bluck et al, 
2005). These three sets of functions make intuitive sense. Were they to be 
translated into a philosophical discourse, they would correspond roughly to the 
axiomatic dimensions of time, identity and space, which have been essential to 
the majority of modern Kantian philosophies of mind. But as constructs that are 
capable of recruiting empirical support, they prove slightly more problematic. 
Harris et al (2014) note that each construct is destabilized to some extent when 
the valence of what is remembered is taken into account. For example, memories 
of loss and negative events do not fit easily into the tripartite scheme, since they 
tend to make our relationships with ourselves and one another more 
complicated, rather than simply more or less continuous or cohesive. Drawing on 
the reminiscence literature (e.g. Webster, 1993), Harris et al suggest instead a 
four factor model of functions, including reflective (i.e. self-focused attention), 
social (i.e. generally positive memories used as social/conversational lubricants), 
ruminative (i.e. self-focused attention concerned with losses and threats) and 
generative (i.e. thinking and talking of the past to project oneself into the future, 
potentially under the shadow of mortality). Whilst this seems to give a more 
rounded account of range of ways we may relate to the past, Harris et al 
acknowledge that it still fails to adequately address the complex relationship 
between remembering and emotional regulation. 
From a discursive perspective, these kinds of shortcomings speak to the 
misguided attempt to impose abstract a priori categories on the situated nature 
of remembering. Inevitably these categories will fail to capture the texture and 
subtleties of what people do with their memories, because they are logically 
rather empirically derived. In their well-known broadside to the everyday 
memory tradition, Edwards & Potter (1992b) argue that the functions of 
remembering are indexed completely to the interactional contexts in which ‘the 
past’ becomes a shared matter of concern. For example, whilst Ulric Neisser 
(1981) famously interpreted John Dean’s Watergate testimony as preserving his 
own self-image, Edwards & Potter read his statements as situated acts that 
manage his own accountability by providing sometimes contradictory accounts 
of events, depending on the line of questioning adopted by the senate committee. 
The category of ‘social’ functions is then massively expanded to cover the fine-
grained and often highly nuanced interactions that make up the everyday (see 
Potter, 2012). Or put slightly differently, there is nothing other than social 
functions, enacted through discursive means: ‘what is required is not merely an 
extension of traditional cognitive concerns into real-world settings, but a re-
focusing of attention upon the dynamics of social action, and in particular, of 
discourse’ (Edwards & Potter, 1992b: 188).  
 
This re-focusing shifts attention to specific and, ideally, naturally occurring 
interactions as the unit of analysis. Whilst this offers the enormous gain of 
studying, as the Conversation Analyst Harvey Sacks once put it, ‘the kinds of 
things that actually occur’ (1992: 419) rather than speculative processes, it 
comes of the cost of foreclosing on how it is that persons come to find 
themselves in these ‘actually occurring’ interactions, and what the implications 
are of having remembered this or that for their future conduct. For example, a 
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person who calls an emergency number threatening to commit suicide and who 
tells of a range of awful things that have happened to them in their past, is 
following a particular life trajectory in which their relation to memory is highly 
significant. There is clearly much to be learned by concentrating on how they 
offer accounts of the past within the immediate telephone interaction, but there 
is probably a great deal more to be learned by cautiously expanding the analysis 
to consider how the collaborative management of difficult memories works 
during times of crisis.  
In a project exploring conflicts in how the July 7th 2005 Bombings of London 
transport sites were remembered (see Allen, 2015; Allen & Brown, 2011; Brown, 
Allen & Reavey, 2016), we had the opportunity to hear from a range of people 
who either survived the explosions, or had a close connection to the events. One 
of the major issues was that, from almost the moment when they emerged from 
the train tunnels, the survivors recognized that they stories they had to tell were 
not entirely their own, but had become public property. Part of the process of 
recovering a life after the bombings was recognizing that what they remembered 
had to be presented cautiously and sensitively to a range of audiences – the 
media, police, relatives of victims, government – who felt they had a legitimate 
claim to construct a narrative around the events. As John Tulloch, who survived 
the Edgware Road blast, puts it ‘I’m faced with Rupert Murdoch’s mob and others, 
er, just using me, constructing me, reconstructing me, at the very same time I’m 
trying to reconstruct myself’ (see Brown et al, 2016: 434). For the survivors, 
creating a sense of self-continuity – i.e. building a relationship between who they 
were before and after 7/7 – became a collective, rather than a purely personal 
project, since it involved continuous engagement with the needs and agendas of 
a host of other people and institutions.  
In fact, many survivors had only fragmentary memories of the events for some 
time after. They had been plunged suddenly and unexpectedly into the confusion 
and darkness of underground train wreckage, some with significant physical 
injuries. The process of reconstructing what exactly had happened was 
accomplished through a range of collaborative means. Some survivors formed an 
association – Kings Cross United – where they met to exchange stories and drew 
diagrams of the train carriage so they place themselves in relation to one another 
at the time of the explosion (see Brown et al, 2016). Others drew on media 
reports and photographs as scaffolding to reconstruct the elements they did 
recall. In a few cases, their recollections were contradicted at a later date 
through testimony from others or chance encounters with other survivors, 
which caused obvious distress. The gap between the personal and the public was 
thoroughly fluid. In a strong sense, what the survivors remembered was not the 
gradual self-accumulation of incomplete episodic memories, but the product of a 
genuinely collective activity. 
What we do with our memory – the various functions served by remembering – 
does need to be indexed to the specific ‘kinds of things that actually occur’. 
Starting anywhere else runs the risk of constructing categories that are, to 
borrow the words of the philosopher Henri Bergson, akin to ‘badly fitting clothes’ 
hung on the actuality of social life. But we cannot be limited to a form of 
empiricism that can only speak of this or that particular interaction. In Vital 
 5 
Memory and Affect, we argue that our lives have both felt continuities and 
discontinuities that extend beyond immediate occurrences and which are 
continuously being refracted through our collaboratively accomplished acts of 
remembering. Thus memories of the same event may take on a very different 
significance, and accomplish different things, depending on the setting where 
they are enacted. This is particularly the case with difficult or distressing 
memories – a subset of autobiographical memory that we refer to as ‘vital 
memory’ since it concerns events that cannot be forgotten and tend to be of 
ongoing concern (see Brown & Reavey, 2015a). Understanding how persons 
make sense of this variability in life trajectories that encompass significant 
‘negative events’ leads us in the same direction as Harris et al (2014) towards 
requiring a conceptualization of the affective dimensions of social remembering. 
Accessibility 
Tulving &  Pearlstone’s (1966) distinction between the availability of a given 
memory (i.e. whether a memory is within the system) and its accessibility at a 
specific point (i.e. whether or not it can be retrieved), is central to an 
understanding of how autobiographical memories are invoked. Whilst much of 
our past experiences are available to us, those that are congruent with current 
mood and with the operant goals of the working self are more accessible, and 
hence are more likely to be recalled (see Conway 2005). In Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce’s (2000) description of the Self-Memory System (SMS) model of 
Autobiographical Memory, the working self is broken down into enduring self-
images, life stories and beliefs/values which intersect with a continuous 
fluctuating goal system, which orders immediate short-term goals in relation to 
broader projects and aspirations. The interaction between these two 
components cues patterns of activation in autobiographical memory, such that 
episodic memories which are relevant the current state of the working self (i.e. 
how we feel about ourselves and the manner in which this disposes us to act) 
have a higher degree of accessibility.  
Recent formulations have also pointed to the link between memory and 
imagination (see Conway & Loveday, 2015). Imagination is here narrowly 
interpreted as the capacity to envisage or anticipate future events. Given the 
significance of goals and projects to the SMS model – i.e. a desired relationship 
between past, present and future – it makes intuitive sense to say that 
remembering is intertwined with imagining. We recollect as part of the same 
process of imagining some anticipated state of affairs or desired relation to 
ourselves and others. The Remembering-Imagining System (RIS) proposed by 
Conway, Loveday & Cole (2016) posits that the degree of accessibility of past 
events and the specificity of imagined futures follows a quasi-normal 
distribution around the present moment, such that the further we mentally 
travel forwards or backwards, the less clearly defined either remembered or 
anticipated events become.  
As with any application of an abstract general function to a specific process, 
there are some issues here. The description of the RIS as a narrow ‘fish-eye lens’ 
on past and future (Conway & Loveday, 2015) fails to account for the significance 
of what Pillemer (2000) calls ‘vivid memories’ of ‘momentous events’, which 
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have a clear directive function on imagined futures, irrespective of the distance 
between the two. Moreover, the current meaning of what is anticipated may lead 
to it being imagined with a level of specificity that is contrary to its temporal 
remoteness. For example, a partner who feels trapped in an unhappy 
relationship may be able to imagine to a fine degree of detail exactly how their 
new home will look and their everyday life will feel when they are finally able to 
break away from their present situation. It may perhaps be that rather than 
speak of remembering and imagining, we should follow Bergson (1991) in 
exploring how attention may be expanded and contracted to include aspects of 
the recalled past and anticipated future, depending on how we are engaged with 
present circumstances.  
Bergson (1992) also famously called for a re-orientation to the value placed on 
memory, claiming that the real issue was not ‘to explain the preservation of the 
past, but rather its apparent abolition’ such that we ‘shall no longer have to 
account for remembering, but for forgetting’ (p.153). The image of a mind 
‘drowning’ in its own memories and therefore paralysed in its current actions is 
an echo of the critique that Nietzsche made some decades before of a dogmatic 
and nostalgic orientation to history (Nietzsche, 1997). The SMS/RIS model 
shares this concern with being caught up in the past, albeit translated into the 
language of system states: 
One of the problems with a memory system that has highly labile patterns 
of activation continuously arising in response to changing cues is that 
memories could, potentially, swamp consciousness. Thus, control process 
must modulate what memories become instantiated in consciousness at 
the same time as monitoring the cue-driven changing patterns of 
activation in long-term memory for information relevant to current goals. 
(Conway & Loveday, 2015: 580) 
There is a convergence here on the idea that something needs to be routinely 
performed in order re-organise and manage our relationship to our pasts in the 
light of current events. For Bergson this is an ontological matter, for Nietzsche an 
historical issue, for experimental psychologists, a cognitive-neural problem. 
There is a missing level of articulation here, namely the social processes that 
organize memorial accessibility. In Derek Edwards’ work on the interactional 
construction of past events, this process can be illuminated through looking at 
specific occasions that involve or require the giving of accounts (i.e. a description 
of persons or events which is organized to manage questions of intentionality, 
responsibility, blame etc). For example, in relationship counseling sessions, 
couples are invited to offer narratives of their personal history and draw 
inferences that support their version of ‘the problems’ that they current 
experience. Edwards (1995) shows in precise detail how particular rhetorical 
devices, such as using modal formulations (e.g. ‘would’, ‘will’), adverbial phrases 
(e.g. ‘always’, ‘sometimes’, ‘usually’) and idioms (e.g. ‘it takes two to tango) are 
key to the reciprocal manner in which each partner will draw together 
descriptions to formulate an account that attends to potential counter-
accusations from the other. These accounts also then become the working 
material for what Edwards calls the ‘solution-oriented discourse’ provided by 
the counselor. Similarly, in Police-Suspect interrogations, accounts of past events 
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are solicited as part of a clear legal agenda of establishing intention and 
culpability. Edwards (2008) shows how this is accomplished by police officers 
through a technique of shifting between different kinds of question formats, such 
that suspects are asked to reformulate their accounts in terms that specify the 
link between action, effect and intention (e.g. by referring to intentional 
‘punching’ of a window rather than neutral ‘smashing’). In both cases, Edwards 
demonstrates that accounts of the past are never neutral, but are systematically 
organized (and contested) within the practice where they are solicited. 
An obvious objection here is that this work merely concerns how events, once 
recollected, are given some additional linguistic gloss in the course of their 
expression. Taking the stance intrinsic to Discursive Psychology, Edwards 
(2006) offers the retort whilst it is certainly not the case that all aspects of 
human existence are linguistic, discourse permeates how the psychological is 
enacted in everyday practice to the extent that there is ‘no realm of subjectivity, 
unconscious feelings, or objective reality, that language does not reach’ 
(Edwards, 2006: 42). Remembering takes place as part of a specific discursive 
practice. Each practice has its own procedures for identifying and accounting for 
psychological matters, whether that be avoiding blame for a failing relationship, 
managing accusations of intentionality from police officers, or perhaps 
demonstrating our competence in a psychological experiment (see also Potter, 
2012). This renders the psychological as empirically tractable in interesting 
ways. There is no need to look for anything ‘beneath’ discourse, since what we 
are trying to explain is enacted within discursive practice, and is explicable to 
those who participate in the practices in terms of the local procedures therein. 
For example, within counselling, how one talks about episodic memories and the 
kinds of memories that are taken to relevant and meaningful, is managed by a 
variety of specific procedures (e.g. choosing significant events, discussing 
feelings, offering interpretations). Discursive procedures are then the actual 
‘control process’ at work in the performance of autobiographical memory. 
However, whilst the focus on practice usefully extends the psychological out of a 
narrow ‘under the skull’ definition of the cognitive system (see Middleton & 
Brown, 2005), it ends up partitioning it anew within discursive practices. In this 
way, the ontological, the historical, the cognitive-neural and the social all lose 
something of their specificity as they become blended, for empirical purposes, 
into the universal solvent of discourse. We would instead treat the various 
processes in play as to some extent distinct, yet becoming enmeshed together in 
the particular circumstances under consideration. The psychological is, precisely, 
this ‘meshwork’ of different interacting processes. To give an extended example, 
current social welfare practice in the UK mandates the use of Life Story work 
with children placed for adoption. Life Story work involves the construction of a 
working document (i.e. a book) telling the life history of the adopted child, 
normally beginning from birth, in a way that is meaningful and understandable 
to them. Carers, foster parents and adopted parents share responsibility for 
ensuring that the life story book is routinely updated, given the transitions the 
child makes between different care settings. One of the challenges of this practice 
is that children who are placed for adoption, especially at a young age, typically 
have experienced either neglect or abuse from biological parents. Carers need to 
find a way to address these issues within the life story in a way that is non-
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judgmental, since representing biological parents as highly at fault is unlikely to 
lead to psychological well-being for the child. They also must present the story in 
a way that is nuanced and non-threatening to the child’s sense of their origins 
and current identity.  
In a study with adoptive parents (see Brookfield, Brown & Reavey, 2008; Brown, 
Reavey & Brookfield, 2013), we explored how various forms of memory – the 
organizational memory of social work practice, the family memories of the 
adoptive family and the memories of children themselves – were tied together in 
life story work. One of the major themes was around the difficulty of managing 
the absence of information about the past (e.g. in cases of international adoption), 
or of working with limited or problematic material (e.g. when the only existing 
photographs of early childhood are police images). Adoptive parents were 
intensely aware that whatever they placed in the book would become part of 
what one parent described as the ‘fantasy life of the adopted child’ (Brookfield et 
al, 2008: 486). They saw themselves as cautiously engaged in the task of trying to 
create a narrative and corresponding set of images to scaffold both what children 
could remember and their imaginative reconstructions of their early life. In some 
cases this involved active collaboration in the work of imagination, such as a 
couple who, at the request of their adopted child, posed for a photograph with a 
baby doll outside the hospital where the child had been born. In all these cases 
there was no question of passing these materials as authentic – they were 
deliberate and acknowledged efforts at providing some anchors for life 
narratives when memory was simply unavailable.  
We see what these adoptive parents do as a form of collaborative ‘managed 
accessibility’. They are not only the legal guardians of their adopted children, but 
also the guardians of their autobiographical memory, which is here understood 
as composed not only of directly experienced episodic memories, but also 
vicarious memories arising from stories from carers and siblings, images and 
imaginative reconstructions. One parent described how she managed her 
adopted daughter’s emergent interests in fire (see Brown & Reavey, 2015a: 125-
127). The child had been placed for adoption, along with older siblings, following 
a house fire started by a biological parent. This created a dilemma. If the 
adoptive parent tried to steer the child away from their interest in fire, she 
would run the risk of being accused at some later point of not having been 
honest, which might compromise the success of the adoption. But telling the 
child at an age where they would be unlikely to grasp the full dimensions of the 
event was judged to be a greater risk. The compromise was for the parents to 
entertain this interest by buying age-appropriate firefighters play costumes, 
whilst deferring telling the child of the event until a later day. In this way they 
can be said to have scaffolded the child’s autobiographical memory whilst 
keeping the events themselves temporarily inaccessible. 
Remembering in collaboration with others does not simply enhance memory, it 
can also render events as inaccessible. As Fagin et al (2015) show, drawing upon 
the Social Shared Retrieval-Induced Forgetting (SS-RIF) model, conversations 
with others can make episodic memories that are unrelated to the discussion in 
hand less accessible, with particular pronounced effects in the shorter term. If 
we situate this in everyday contexts, such as those that occur between adults and 
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children, within families and in personal relationships, we can start to see the 
accessibility of memory as itself a collaborative accomplishment. Not only are 
‘control process’ not entirely cognitive (in the manner suggested by the SMS/RIS 
model), but there is now an implied double meaning. Where there are 
asymmetries in power and authority, collaborative remembering can involve a 
‘taking charge’ or ‘custodianship’ of the memories of others. Whilst much of this 
may be enacted in discursive practices, it also ties together very different kinds 
of memory, forms of evidence and imaginative work. We might ask not only how 
autobiographical memory is shaped through conversation, but also how it is 
shaped by living through particular political and economic times. Particular 
modes of governance (e.g. disability assessment, unemployment benefit 
monitoring, psychiatric care) can act as collective Remembering-Imagining 
systems, shaping what is speakable and hearable about the pasts of those within 
them (on the latter example, see Brown & Reavey, 2017a).  
Accuracy 
The criterion of ‘accuracy’ seems, at first glance, to be fairly fundamental to the 
psychology of memory. Certainly the vast majority of experimental paradigms 
that have been developed throughout the past hundred years or so of laboratory 
based research depend, in one way on another, on establishing the extent to 
which a given recollection maps onto prior stimulus or event. This has the result 
of constructing accuracy as the default state to which the cognitive system ought 
to tend. It makes intuitive sense to say that remembering things as they actually 
happened has some function and/or adaptive value (see Tulving, 1985), since it 
serves as the basis for applying knowledge to current circumstances. But this 
intuitive support for the criterion of accuracy becomes less straightforward 
when we move from semantic memory – where getting it right matters a great 
deal – to autobiographical memory. As we have already seen, taking a functional 
approach to these latter suggests that having a more flexible orientation to the 
events that make up our life experiences is probably more adaptive. For example, 
the capacity to reconstruct unfortunate autobiographical memories in ways that 
elaborate and expand upon their current significance in terms of ‘lessons learned’ 
or their place within a broader arc of personal development has far greater 
adaptive value than the ability to accurately recall the underpinning details. 
So the step towards understanding the everyday contexts in which episodic 
memory is enacted is, as Ulric Neisser (1978) declaimed, to be greatly welcomed. 
Here Elizabeth Loftus’ hugely significant body of work is exemplary (e.g. Loftus & 
Ketcham, 1992, 1995; Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). Although the vast majority of her 
work is done within the laboratory, rather than in natural contexts themselves, 
the questions her work poses are relevant and meaningful in those contexts. For 
instance, her early work on errors and biases in eyewitness testimony (e.g. 
Loftus, 1996), engages with the problem of the gap between the event itself and 
the multiple occasions on which testimony is given during the legal process. As 
Motzkau’s (2009; 2010) work with legal professionals who work with child 
witnesses has shown, a crucial issue is with the preservation of the evidence 
provided through oral testimony, given the undisputed tendency for recollection 
to become less precise over time. Moreover, given that eyewitnesses are typically 
asked to recall the event on multiple occasions, at some points under the highly 
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suggestive conditions of preparing for trial, and at others under the highly 
adversarial conditions of being examined in court, there are numerous occasions 
where potential errors and confabulations might occur. 
Much as the focus on bias and error provides a way to link experimental work to 
real-world concerns, it also raises some difficult questions regarding precisely 
what it is that laboratory findings deliver to public debate in this particular case. 
Loftus’ contributions to the so-called ‘memory wars’ are well documented and 
discussed (see Loftus & Ketcham, 1992; Pope, 1996; Campbell, 2003). Her most 
significant accomplishment was to argue that if it can be shown under laboratory 
conditions that participants will apparently willingly recall false information 
about non-occurring events this significantly undermines the credibility of 
‘recovered memories’ (i.e. memories of traumatic events that had been 
previously inaccessible) (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995; Loftus, 1997). There are 
numerous objections to this claim, on epistemic, methodological, moral and 
political grounds (see Ashmore et al, 2005; Crook & Dean, 1999). But we want to 
merely point to the asymmetrical basis on which this argument is grounded. The 
possibility of producing ‘false’ memories in the laboratory does not necessarily 
bring into question whether recovered memories are ‘true’ since the verification 
of falsity is not equivalent to the refutation of claims to truth, especially when it 
involves comparing across different contexts, settings and practices. Maintaining 
the analogue between laboratory and courtroom would require instead the 
experimental demonstration that recovered memory was a falsifiable 
phenomenon. 
Clearly it is important to separate out within the broad research area that is 
sometimes referred to as ‘false memory studies’ (see Wade et al, 2002; 2009), 
work that is primarily concerned with deconstructing ‘recovered memory’ from 
that which investigates specific ‘false memory’ processes, despite it being the 
case that the term ‘false memory’ itself arose as a political rather than a scientific 
concept (see Campbell, 2003). However the framing of memory in terms or ‘truth’ 
and ‘falsity’ is somewhat of an obstacle here. When Loftus claims that ‘in essence 
all memory is false to some degree’ (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009: 373), then the 
very idea of being able to disambiguate recollections that can be verified from 
those which cannot is rendered problematic. And if this distinction does not hold, 
then why label some processes in terms of their relation to supposed ‘falseness’ 
at all, since they are likely to be the same processes that attract the external 
judgment of ‘truth’? Elsewhere we have suggested that psychologists who are in 
the business of working with a false/true distinction would be better off 
adopting the terms ‘relatively falsified’ and ‘as-yet-unfalsified’ memories when 
referring to how given recollections survive specific tests of accuracy and 
veridicality (Brown & Reavey, 2017b).  
We think this distinction is important because it shifts the debate away from the  
‘false positive’ – the person who remembers a significant event, such as child 
sexual abuse, which is subsequently falsified – towards a broader concern with 
the way in which memory intersects with professional practices. For example, 
take 100 women who feel they are able to make an accusation of childhood 
sexual abuse. Based on typical reporting rates in the UK and USA, only 32 will be 
reported to the police. Of this number, only 7 cases will lead to an arrest, and 
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only 3 cases are likely to be referred to prosecutors. At trial, just 2 cases (of the 
overall 100) will end in successful prosecution. So the question of whether or not 
a given recollection stands in need of formal falsification applies to only 3% of 
cases – since these are the only ones that come to court - and in only 2% of cases 
is there a potential issue of a ‘false positive’ that might require deconstruction 
through the application of psychological research. That leaves 97% of cases as 
‘relatively falsified’ – that is to say, as not having at some point not met the 
evidential bar for proceeding to the next level in the legal process.  
At first glance this does indeed seem to suggest that ‘false memory processes’ are 
a relevant issue to be explained given the numbers involved. However, using a 
reference class of 100 women, we can estimate that 68 women who do not 
formally report their accusation are likely to do because issues such as fear of the 
abuser, distrust of the police, a desire to move on with their lives and so on. Of 
those who do make a report, the 25 cases that are not pursued are likely to be 
because the police investigation is unable to secure other forms of evidence, or 
inconsistencies in testimony, or because the victim withdraws the claim. The 4 
out of 7 cases that are passed to prosecutors but do not proceed to court are 
almost always cases where prosecutors are concerned that the witness will not 
make a good impression on a jury, because they are inarticulate, angry or do not 
conform to the normative conduct of a ‘victim’ (see Motzkau, 2010). At the end of 
this process, there are the 3 cases where there is a legal outcome, and hence a 
meaningful question to be asked about the effect of ‘false memory processes’. 
However, in the 97 other cases, ‘false memory’ issues around ‘imagination 
inflation’, ‘social contagion’, ‘suggestibility’, ‘guided imagery’ and so on are 
beside the point because the reasons these cases do not proceed further is 
explained by factors such as engagement with social-welfare services, social and 
economic conditions, the co-presence of other forms of emotional abuse, or 
capacity for self-presentation. So the vast majority of ‘relatively falsified 
memories’ – i.e. what are treated as ‘false memories’ within the experimental 
tradition – are explained by exploring social rather than narrowly psychological 
factors.  
Here the value becomes clear of the methodological focus of discursive 
psychology on naturalistic data – i.e. tape recordings of everyday events – rather 
than on laboratory analogues. Discursive work prefers to show how accounts of 
past events are evaluated ‘live’ within the practices where they are offered and 
evaluated, rather than speculate on in principle criterion which might 
differentiate between true and false memories. For example, Clare MacMartin 
and Linda Wood’s work analyses actual judicial sentencing judgments in trials of 
child sexual abuse to explore how attributions of intentions and consent are 
discursively constructed. They demonstrate, based on analysis of 74 Canadian 
judicial decisions in cases of child sexual assault, how judges drew upon a 
language of sexual motivation to construct the crimes committed as warranting 
very particular and stringent legal sentences (MacMartin & Wood, 2005). Judges 
also did considerable work to re-describe the behaviour and testimony of the 
convicted offenders in terms of whether or not some form of ‘remorse’ (an 
important legal consideration) could have be said to have been shown (Wood & 
MacMartin, 2007). What this illustrates is that legal judgments in cases of child 
sexual abuse depend not solely on establishing the fundamental ‘facts’ of the case, 
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but on a complex work of attributing motives, turning around on matters of 
consent (even where consent is legally not possible), mitigation and remorse. 
Motzkau (2010) shows that this process is also at work in the way child 
witnesses are treated during investigations and in the deliberations legal 
professionals make about whether to proceed with a prosecution. For example, 
police officers conducting video interviews with children worry a great deal 
about how the precise conduct of the interview may or may not lead to future 
accusation of collusion or ‘tainted evidence’ depending on the particular line of 
questioning they adopt in dealing with a vulnerable young person who they need 
to have describe in great detail events which are highly distressing to them.  
In short, a concern with legal ‘false positives’ fails to attend to the particular 
practices through which memory and testimony is handled in legal processes. 
Investigators and judges are well aware of the frailties of memory, and that what 
is remembered, especially in cases with vulnerable witnesses, is co-produced by 
the victim and professionals who work with them throughout the legal process 
(see also MacMartin, 1999; 2002). Courts of law systematically re-describe the 
testimony they are offered to make attributions around intention, consent, self-
knowledge and so on. Equally, these same matters are at issue in other settings, 
such as therapy, where they are treated in very different ways in line with the 
intended outcomes of the practice. For example, whilst a demonstration of the 
irreparably negative impact of an event may be critical to securing a conviction 
against an abuser, in therapy the idea of victimhood may be rejected to some 
degree in the pursuit of the more adaptive status of ‘survivor’ (Reavey & Warner, 
2003). And in the course of everyday adult life, a person who has suffered 
childhood sexual abuse, may shift their focus across a range of details of the 
experience, which they may actively seek to frame in different ways, depending 
on its relevance to their current life circumstance. 
We have found that exploring these differences in how the same experiences are 
recalled across occasions reveals the value of ambiguity and ambivalence rather 
than accuracy (see Reavey & Brown, 2006; 2009). Survivors of child sexual abuse 
typically remember events with high levels of detail. But they also remember 
how those details were experienced at the time as a child, and the ways in which 
they subsequently come to reflect upon them as an adult. For example, one 
woman recalled how her abuser would remove the drawers from a piece of 
furniture in her childhood bedroom. At the time, this had the effect of making the 
chest of drawers look monstrous and frightening, but subsequently this became 
a recollection of a betrayal by a father who removed the most basic domestic 
comforts from their child (see Brown & Reavey, 2015a). Another participant 
talked at length of how her brother had removed the handle from the door in the 
room in which he then proceeded to sexually abuse her. She described how she 
had struggled for some time in her interpretation of this particular act. If the 
brother had deliberately intended to lock the door, as his actions would suggest, 
then this would render his actions as a deliberate choice. However ‘part of her’, 
wished this was not the case, that she could believe instead that his actions were 
a matter of immature ‘curiosity’ (see Brown & Reavey, 2015a: 94-97). This 
interpretive dilemma was further compounded by elements of pleasure within 
the memory, which had been a profound source of guilt to her. Not settling upon 
a clear interpretation, allowing for an ambiguity around her brother’s actions, 
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seemed to allow this woman to maintain a functional ambivalence around the 
unsettled range of feelings bound up in the memory. 
Whilst the law maintains proper criterion around the extent to which children 
can be seen as able to exercise choice generally, and particularly around consent 
to sexual activity, this does not stop survivors from ruminating on the question 
of the extent to which they made some kind of choice at the time. This is 
complicated by the fact that childhood sexual abuse rarely happens outside of a 
set of contexts – e.g. family relationships, socio-economic factors etc – where 
abuse is facilitated. In one case, a survivor described how life in her childhood 
family home was so disordered and without any sense of privacy, that she 
actively chose to stay at a relative’s house to gain some space, which 
unfortunately and unknowingly placed her at risk of abuse (Brown & Reavey, 
2015a: 100-102). To say that she had no choice as a child in all matters would be 
to negate how she did actively have agency in relation to some aspects of events 
that seem to have forced her to make adult-like decisions. Sifting through this 
complex prism of agency and victimhood through which she recalls these events 
is crucial to the ways she currently thinks of her current agency.  
Some discursive psychological approaches to remembering have, at times, 
seemed to suggest that a concern with accuracy is unimportant (for instance, 
Middleton & Brown, 2005 – mea culpa). We would without hesitation say to the 
contrary that accuracy is always important. However, the criterion and 
procedures through which accuracy is established vary considerably across 
practices. What the law requires from memory is different to the demands 
placed on it by therapy, which is different again from what family and personal 
relationships seek from it, and so on. Not only is there is no superordinate 
criterion that we as psychologists can draw upon to make definitive judgments – 
since the laboratory is one more practice amongst others with its own specific 
procedures – there is also no individual capacity that we could advise persons to 
draw upon. If remembering always happens in context, and usually 
collaboratively, then we should start by studying the setting-specificity of those 
contextual acts and the manner in which the uses we make of our memory are 
fitted to the matters-in-hand.  
Life Story 
The motif that runs throughout this chapter is of the importance of context for 
understanding the uses that persons make of their autobiographical memory. 
Function, accessibility and accuracy are established and managed within 
interactional contexts, formal settings and associated practices. But there is one 
other important contextual dimension: namely, the overall sense of a ‘life’ which 
both emerges from and serves as the frame for our remembering past 
experiences. Conway (2005) uses the notion of ‘coherency’ to denote the relative 
fit of ‘complex episodic memories’ with an ongoing sense of self, with 
‘correspondence’ being the literal fit with the previous experienced event. In this 
way, accuracy can be reformulated as the placing of a recollection within the two 
dimensions of life-history and events at the time. However, coherency is 
relatively determined within the SMS model as the need to assimilate past events 
into a current sense of self (see Conway, Singer & Tagini, 2004). As Habermas & 
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Köber (2015) observe, this raises the question of what happens when what is 
remembered differs considerably from the current version of self. 
An alternative is to conceptualise an underpinning sense of self-continuity that 
subsists whatever life-stories we might currently be engaged in telling (see Alea 
& Bluck, 2003). This pre-reflective, felt sense of continuity has considerable 
philosophical appeal. It would suggest that, as Heidegger (1962), once put it, we 
are the sort of being which has a concern for what and who it is, and is thus 
continuously reflecting on its own past and anticipating its future. This kind of 
concern to fit past experience into an ongoing ‘perspective’ or life trajectory 
seems to be present from adolescence onwards (see Bauer et al, 2016). A further 
advantage of distinguishing between self-continuity and life history is that it 
allows for the possibility that at different historical moments, and across cultural 
contexts, there are different ways of constituting ‘self’ and its relative importance, 
whilst nevertheless retaining the idea of there being an necessary self-continuity 
that is taken to be common to all these versions of ‘self-ing’ (see Nelson, 2003).  
The question then shifts towards understanding how autobiographical 
remembering intersects with self-continuity. Habermas & de Silveira (2008) 
conceptualise this in terms of the coherence that emerges developmentally in life 
narratives – that is, the progressive constitution of an overarching ‘life story’ – 
through the operation of autobiographical memory. Yet many people also 
experience life events that prove disruptive of their life narratives, such as 
failures at work or study, shortcomings as a parent or a partner, of abrupt shifts 
in direction as a consequence of unexpected events. Here, recalling episodic 
events that support the prior life narrative, or attempting to otherwise assimilate 
the present in the grand sweep of a ‘life’ may not in itself be sufficient. Habermas 
& Köber (2015) suggest that specific forms of ‘autobiographical reasoning’ may 
be required, such as using the idea of ‘turning points’ in life or ‘lessons learned’. 
These forms of reasoning may help to repair disruptive events within the life 
narrative, and hence maintain felt self-continuity. 
From a discursive perspective, it makes sense to understand these forms of 
reasoning as narrative devices. There is a rich body of work here to draw upon, 
including Bruner’s (1992) notions of ‘storytelling’, Gergen’s (1995) 
conceptualization of narrative accounts, and most pertinently, Harré’s 
description of narrative ‘positioning’ (see Davis & Harré, 1990). The common 
message here is that the skills through which we recognize our ‘selves’ are 
fundamentally literary ones. The self is ‘authored’ into being through the stories 
that we tell (Bruner, 2004). We know who we are through the fashioning of 
narratives about our life experiences, which draw on the broader cultural tropes 
and modes of storytelling that exist in the cultural milieus into which we are 
socialised. So what Conway or Habermas regard as nascent cognitive skills 
become for Mark Freeman (1993) the learned authorial abilities to put ‘rewrite 
the self’ in narrative terms.  
Discursive work has been able to demonstrate how these kinds of skills are 
developed through interaction. In Edwards & Middleton’s (1986; 1988) studies 
of parents and children jointly recollecting the past, they observe the way in 
which parents instruct children in making inferences on the basis of photographs, 
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along with techniques for constructing accounts of past events that are relevant 
to present circumstances. For Edwards and Middleton, remembering is a learned, 
interactional achievement. However, unlike Robyn Fivush’s similar work on 
parent-child interactions around memory (Fivush 2011; Fivush et al. 2011), 
Edwards and Middleton are not interested in speculating as to the relationship 
between discursive processes and cognitive processes. Discursive Psychologists 
tend to see experience as an interactional accomplishment that requires neither 
a notion of ‘cognitive’ nor ‘narrative’ coherence (see Potter 2012). As Strawson 
(2004) puts it, there are many people who live ‘non-episodic lives’, where their 
past is of only limited interest: 
I have a perfectly good grasp of myself as having a certain personality, but 
I’m completely uninterested in the answer to the question ‘What has GS 
made of his life?’, or ‘What have I made of my life?’. I’m living it, and this 
sort of thinking about it is no part of it. This does not mean that I am in 
any way irresponsible. It is just that what I care about, in so far as I care 
about myself and my life, is how I am now. The way I am now is 
profoundly shaped by my past, but it is only the present shaping con- 
sequences of the past that matter, not the past as such. (Strawson, 2004: 
438) 
Although we do not share the broader ethical and epistemological concerns that 
Strawson goes on to articulate, his point that that we should not place immediate 
value on the idea of finding continuity in life, beyond the basic sense of being 
more-or-less the same person over time is well put. We should perhaps treat 
autobiographical memory as the sufficient rather than the necessary conditions of 
personhood. Indeed, we can imagine instances where a person is able to access a 
great many autobiographical memories without a corresponding singular sense 
of continuity. For example, persons who have a multiple sense of belonging to 
different and perhaps conflicting communities. A lack of coherency is typically 
treated within the AM literature as indicative of some form and cognitive and/or 
neurological dysfunction. Conway uses the term ‘broken memories’ to refer to 
instances where ‘personal beliefs and meanings are no longer grounded in and 
constrained by specific autobiographical memories’ (Conway & Loveday, 2015: 
6). But this pathologising of non-continuity in memory is not helpful, since it 
disattends to the variety of ‘non-episodic’ ways in which we might relate to our 
own pasts. 
In work with forensic psychiatric service-users currently detained in secure 
hospital environments (see Brown & Reavey, 2016b; Brown et al, 2014), we have 
found that there are many aspects of how psychiatric services are delivered in 
these settings that shape the uses that patients can make of their past. Detention 
under a section of the mental health act (i.e. being sectioned) is a significant life 
experience. Forensic mental health service users have in addition either been 
convicted or accused of a criminal offence (or an ‘index offence’). The major 
concern on secure units is with managing the risk that a patient poses to 
themselves and others. Evaluating this risk requires that staff are aware of the 
index offence along with the recent prison and/or hospital career of the patient, 
but it is not seen to require detailed knowledge of their prior life. In fact, one of 
the most common initial responses from patients during research interviews 
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was of surprise at being asked about their life before admission. As one patient 
put it, she had in effect left her past life ‘at the door’ when she arrived, and lived 
in hope of picking it back up again on release (Brown et al, 2014). These patients 
were then living ‘non-episodic lives’ not out of choice or because of their current 
mental health, but because of the way that the care regime operates on the unit. 
This was further compounded for patients by uncertainty over their 
rehabilitation (many ‘sections’ are open-ended and depend upon medical 
judgment) and the repetitive nature of life on a closed ward. 
As we saw in the last section, distressing life experiences tend to occur in 
particular contexts. Many forensic mental health service users have been victims 
of childhood neglect or sexual abuse, and have experiences of precarious living in 
difficult socioeconomic conditions. There is much in the autobiographical 
memories of these patients that they would like to not dwell upon. But at the 
same time, their connection to the past, in the form of personal relationships, 
family relationships and a relationship to place can be critical. One of the most 
robust findings with the literature on the social contexts of mental health is on 
the importance of these kinds of relationships to achieving some sense of well-
being (see Cromby, Harper & Reavey, 2014). However, these relationships are 
complicated by the past behaviour of the patient, and the possibilities for their 
resumption following release may be low. Patients often speak in highly 
idealized ways about their future life, which draw heavily on autobiographical 
memories. For example, one patient spoke of his desire to see his children again, 
to hear their voices, but as they were in the past rather than at their current 
chronological age. Rather than see this a deployment of some form of ‘broken 
memory’, we can instead approach this in terms of the complexity of holding 
together a range of discontinuous life narratives under circumstances that 
facilitate a ‘non-episodic’ relation to self.  
Remembering the past and anticipating the future are clearly activities that are 
deeply intertwined. For some people, this can take the form of richly elaborated 
narratives in which they are the author of their own destinies. Disruptions to the 
stories they tell can be neatly assimilated into the twists and turns of the 
narrative arc they are continuously weaving. Doubtless in the other direction, 
there are people who have very little interest in the significance of the past 
either because they have sufficient cultural and material capital for it not to 
become an issue, or, alternatively, because they are living lives of extreme 
precarity which are predominantly focused by daily struggle. Living a non-
episodic life is rarely a choice – it is a mode of existence that is facilitated by 
socioeconomic conditions. Telling who one is through discontinuous life 
narratives is not a marker of pathology. It is what can happen to people who 
have to live with distressing life experiences and are denied the status of self-
author. 
Conclusion 
At repeated points in its history, the psychology of memory has broadened its 
concerns and investigations beyond that of studying individual recall to explore 
the place of remembering in the broader sweep of personal lives. Martin Conway 
and colleagues refer to the most recent phase of this movement as ‘the modern 
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view of memory’ (see Conway, 2012). They authoritatively state that at the core 
of this are the key tents that memories are constructions rather than 
reproductions of past experience, that they involve a work of inference and time-
compression, that they are a source of personal meanings and serve a broad 
range of social functions, and that their value comes from both correspondence 
with past events and coherence with life narratives (Conway et al 2004). Whilst 
there are philosophical and methodological debates to be had about the 
operationalization of the approach, for those that wish to direct their efforts in 
this direction, there is, for us, very little here that separates cognitive and 
discursive approaches. The two approaches converge on the shared problems of 
making sense of how questions around function, accessibility, accuracy and life 
story can be studied in the actual contexts where persons make use of their 
memories. 
We see an ‘expanded view of memory’ as one that is primarily concerned with 
the situated, contextual and functional aspects of remembering (see Brown & 
Reavey, 2015a; 2015b). It treats remembering as the joint work of a number of 
processes that occur within distinct settings (e.g. legal settings, therapeutic 
settings, educational settings, family settings etc). Each of these has its own 
procedures and criterion for establishing matters of accuracy and relevancy. 
Thus we would see all episodic or autobiographical remembering as to some 
extent collaborative – in that it occurs in the course of routine interaction with 
actual or anticipated others – and as shaped by the specificity of the setting 
through which it is accomplished. The overarching problem is with 
conceptualizing how each of us nevertheless manages to maintain some measure 
of personal continuity – a sense of a ‘life’ – despite much of our autobiographical 
remembering being inextricably bound up with the specificities of the settings 
and practices that constitute daily existence.  
The processes at work in every instance of autobiographical remembering 
include, of course, some that are ‘under the skull’ and which are related to 
neurological function. But the greater part of the processes fall within the 
domain that is variously called ‘extended’, ‘distributed’ or ‘transactional’ 
cognition (see Sutton et al, 2010), which includes social practices and discursive 
procedures along with formal organizational processes, such as archiving, record 
keeping and data management. This broader view of the cognitive, where 
remembering involves the recruitment of diverse ranges of materials in joint 
projects of sense-making, sets some significant conceptual and empirical 
challenges. One way forward, we suggest, is to see that notions such ‘control 
process’ can be made to work just as well ‘outwith’ as well as ‘under’ the skull. As 
we discussed in the case of the management of the memories of adopted children 
by family members, there is a great deal to be gained by exploring how memorial 
accessibility is practically accomplished by families through the situated use of 
artefacts. The ‘control process’ may be seen as itself extended and distributed in 
nature. 
We recognize that expanding the domain of the psychological in this way makes 
the need for solid conceptual innovation ever greater. An interesting way of 
envisaging this is through the notion of a ‘meshwork’ suggested by the 
anthropologist Tim Ingold (2013). Consider, for example, a kite being flown. A 
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reasonable question to ask would be what distinguishes ‘good’ and ‘bad’ kite-
flying. Clearly this has something to do with the skills and experiences of the 
person holding the string. But just as importantly it is a function of the material 
design and structure of the kite that is at the other end. And, equally, it depends 
upon the meteorological conditions – the varying patterns of wind gust that 
occur given the particular landscape and broader climatic atmosphere. Kite-
flying is an accomplishment of the conjoining of these ‘flows’ of skill, varying 
material propensities, and environmental fluctuations into a contingent process. 
Ingold uses the phrase ‘transduction’ to understand the exchanges that occur 
here. The flyer translates their experience into an ongoing kinesthetic awareness 
and responsiveness to the movements of the kite, which arises from its shifting 
material adaptation to the wind. Wind, kite, string and hand together produce 
flight. 
Something similar is at work, we would argue, in remembering. If epigeneticists 
can legitimately take the view that what we previously saw as narrowly 
biological outcomes are actually made possible through the transduction of 
environmental conditions into processes of DNA methylisation or histone 
modification, then, by comparison, psychologists of memory might feel 
themselves similarly secure in arguing that what we remember involves the 
transduction of neural, interactional, material and environmental processes into 
an extended notion of the cognitive. Brains, voices, objects and settings together 
form a meshwork out of which episodic memories are constructed and put to 
work to some purpose. What we need to do is to understand the transductions 
that occur in these contexts, to follow the movements back and forth, in the 
contingent constitution of the past within the present. 
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